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Abstract 
This article analyses the challenges of implementing a new electronic identification (eID) framework in 
Finland. We employ the theoretical lens of dialectics to explain how two opposing forces in the form of 
public and private actors, the government and banks respectively, engaged in a process of resistance 
and acquiescence. By interviewing the key organizations from both sides, we identify the rationale of 
the conflict, mechanisms that have led and may lead to further conflict, and the outcome. The root cause 
of the problems with the framework include the conflicting goals of the government and banks: the 
regulators’ interests to create more competition in the market, generate cost savings, decrease the de-
pendence on banks vs. the objectives of the banks to maintain the status quo. Moreover, the framework 
implementation practices, such as the hard enforcement strategy, inherent infrastructuring mindset of 
the government and communication problems, have considerably contributed to further conflict devel-
opment. As a result, divergent views on the framework architecture and the pricing models are the 
outcomes of the confrontation. Our findings emphasize the importance of strategic and operational co-
herence in the governance of a changing ecosystem with a proprietary banking platform playing a role 
in a national eID scheme.  
Keywords: electronic identification (eID), ecosystem transformation, BankID, e-identification infra-
structure, dialectics theory 
 
1 Introduction 
According to the European Union’s recent ranking on the integration of digital technology, the Nordic 
countries retain their leadership positions as the most advanced digital economies in Europe (European 
Commission, 2018). Well-established digital identification infrastructures are justifiably regarded as one 
of the main contributors to the success. In Finland, like in Sweden and Norway, eID services are pro-
cured in the open market with bank identifiers as the de facto method of e-identification both in private 
sector and in e-governmental services. Despite being a pragmatic solution, the market-procured ap-
proach involves a number of challenges, namely market dynamics, technological changes, the regulation 
and political interests that influence the power relationship between government and banks when nego-
tiating a common approach to the governance of an eID infrastructure (Medaglia, Hedman and Eaton, 
2017a). Banks ownership of the identification infrastructures has been criticized for hindering competi-
tion and for taking an advantage of their market dominance position (Murphy, 2012). Among other 
criticisms is the geographical limitation of the method, which has inherent limitations in scaling into a 
global system (Teigland et al., 2018).  
Nevertheless, the Nordic model of bank-provided eID solutions is a success story. While some countries 
are attempting to replicate the BankID system (e.g., for Ukraine, see www.bankid.org.ua) or develop 
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second-generation BankID systems (for Norway, see www.bankid.no/xid), other countries are making 
radically different choices. Inspired by Estonian advances in establishing government-issued e-identifi-
cation, the state of Finland is seeking to change the BankID dominance. The government seems to be in 
a constant deliberation whether to create a state-issued eID solution, but the banks do not want to give 
up the strong position of BankID. In this article, we describe the governmental effort to diminish the 
role of banks in Finnish eID ecosystem. We wanted to understand internal conflicts and contradictions 
among actors involved in the transformation of a digital infrastructure - a nation-wide e-identification 
method. At a more abstract level, this paper looks into the problem of dialectical relationship behind the 
development of an information system (IS) infrastructure. In order to answer this question, it is useful 
to break it down into a dialectic between opposing views on the eID infrastructure, with government 
and regulators representing the thesis, and banks the antithesis.   
Thesis: The government should fully control the eID infrastructure.  
Antithesis: The market is the best guarantor for a cheap and reliable eID infrastructure. 
Investigating the case from two perspectives helps us to observe fundamental arguments of the plat-
form owners and the government. For example, due to increasing online fraud and identity theft, the eID 
solutions need to satisfy the state-of-the-art security and privacy requirements. This involves significant 
investments from system owners, especially when the identification infrastructure becomes increasingly 
used, leading to further issues of costs (Whitley, Gal and Kjaergaard, 2014). IS scholars, for example, 
raise questions as to whether the maintenance costs of the increasingly widely used infrastructures 
should be shared by the relying parties that receive indirect benefits from using it (Whitley et al., 2014; 
Patala, Albareda and Halme, 2018). The motivation for our study was our observation (Bazarhanova, 
Yli-Huumo and Smolander, 2019) of the significant variance of views between different actors concern-
ing changes to the infrastructure, their costs and benefits, which requires the actors to engage in negoti-
ations to resolve the conflicts caused by the variance.  
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. We introduce the case by providing a snapshot view 
of the framework implementation process. In the background section, we discuss research on eIDs and 
present the theoretical lens of dialectics. Then, we present the research approach, data collection and 
analysis of the empirical data. After presenting the findings, we turn to the discussion, where we high-
light the contributions of the study to research and practice, and we also discuss limitations of the study. 
The paper ends with conclusions. 
1.1 Case description 
In August 2018, the Ministry of Finance in Finland announced the government’s decision to explore 
alternative methods for electronic identification of citizens after 2020. This far identification in Finland 
has been dominated by the bank-provided eID solutions, with a total number of 100.9 million transac-
tions in 20171. Current strong customer authentication (SCA) methods in Finland are online banking 
identifiers (BankID), mobile certificates from telecom operators (MobileID) and state-issued certificate 
cards from the Population Register Centre (FineID), the shares of which in public services transactions 
were 96%,  around 3% and less than 1% percent respectively in 2017. Identification method providers 
(IdP), for example bank and telecommunications companies, provide both public and private sectors 
with their SCA solutions, such as bank identifiers or mobile certificates. 
The decision to explore alternative identification methods was preceded by two rounds of partially suc-
cessful public procurement in 2017 and 2018, where some banks as IdPs and the public sector as a 
procuring entity could not agree on mutually acceptable pricing models. In the most recent (the third) 
procurement in October 2018, the agreements were finally reached between the banks and public sector. 
However, the use of bank-provided eID solutions is secured temporarily and only for the period of 2019 
- 2020. Finland, similar to other Nordic countries, follows a market-procured model where the IdPs can 
offer their audited and qualified solutions to the public sector. The need for a renewed procurement was 
                                                     
1 https://www.suomenpankki.fi/en/Statistics/payments-statistics/tables/ 
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created by the maximum budget of 5 million EUR per year to cover the identification costs of the public 
sector; and the newly introduced e-identification framework – Finnish Trust Network (FTN) (Ministry 
of Transport and Communications, 2016) that came into force in mid-2017.   
The FTN framework, which was created in compliance with the EU Regulation on electronic identifi-
cation and trust services (eIDAS), has introduced a number of architectural and business changes in the 
eID ecosystem. First, it introduced the role of service brokers between the identity providers and the 
relying parties. The service broker is the entity that delivers SCA solutions to various relying party 
services, i.e., e-commerce service providers or e-government platform. The idea behind the FTN frame-
work creation was to help relying parties to acquire the eID services via a single proxy, i.e., one point 
of technical integration and simplified contractual agreements, thus, expanding the use of eIDs. Second, 
the framework has put a price cap on BankID identification transactions, reduction was from about 0.5 
to 0.1 EUR. It has also authorized the chaining of electronic identifiers, i.e., a recreation of new eIDs 
(e.g., MobileID, a competing solution provided by telecoms) based on existing strongly authenticated 
eIDs (BankID method) in return for a fee of 2.5 euros max.   
2 Theoretical background 
This section provides a short overview of the research on e-identification. We also justify the use of 
dialectics as the theoretical lens. 
2.1 Research on e-identification 
With an increasing number of services provided online, digital identification plays an important role in 
societies. Thus, the research on electronic identification schemes has not been void. Scholars from dif-
ferent fields have investigated policy, technology, societal issues in a wide variety of ways. As pointed 
out by scholars (Whitley et al., 2014), an absolute analytical separation of technological and social issues 
of digital identity is proving to be increasingly unhelpful in studying contemporary practices. As a result, 
the vast majority of studies analyse the public sector eIDs by laying out technological (Marsalek et al., 
2017), organizational (Melin, Axelsson and Söderström, 2016) and legal (Lentner and Parycek, 2016) 
dimensions such as the articles analysing the Danish (Hoff and Hoff, 2010), Norwegian (Murphy, 2014) 
and Swedish cases (Grönlund, 2010; Söderström, 2016). 
A large proportion of this literature focuses on national identification schemes. See, for example, articles 
about the path dependency of national electronic identities (Kubicek and Noack, 2010), the emergence 
of national eID schemes (Söderström and Melin, 2012), policy options for the regulation of electronic 
identity (Hoikkanen, Bacigalupo, Compano and Lusoli, 2010) or the role of trust and public value in 
electronic identity management (Seltsikas and O’keefe, 2010). 
A specific type of market-procured eID schemes that are widespread in the Nordics (Husz, 2018) have 
also been widely investigated. Several publications have appeared documenting the banks provided eIDs 
due to the presence of complex public-private relationship between actors (Medaglia et al., 2017a; 
Medaglia, Hedman and Eaton, 2017b). Bank identifiers reuse as a national eID infrastructure have been 
criticized for technical weaknesses and vulnerabilities in (Espelid, Netland, Klingsheim and Hole, 2008; 
Gjøsteen, 2008) but also the benefits (Eaton, Hallingby, Nesse and Hanseth, 2014) have been empha-
sized.  
While acknowledging the importance of pure technological or policy aspects of identification mecha-
nisms, we choose to focus primarily on the information systems perspective: the interplay of policy, 
technology and management questions around identification at the organization level. A recent cross-
country comparison on the emergence of a national eID infrastructures in Sweden, Denmark and Nor-
way (Eaton, Hedman and Medaglia, 2017) is a particularly relevant research to our study. It covers the 
period from 1990s to 2016, where authors explain a complex interplay of interests, governance and, 
resources among the government and the banks. We position our paper as the missing part of the Finnish 
case to complement the research on BankID evolution in the Nordics while focusing on a contemporary, 
more radical phase of transformation. 
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2.2 Dialectics theory 
In a study referenced above (Eaton et al., 2017), authors analyse how the balance of converging and 
diverging interests, the shift in resources from independent to interdependent, and the governance struc-
tures influenced the process of a national eID infrastructure establishment, which they theorize as a 
dialectical process model of evolution. Likewise, we choose the dialectical process lens because of the 
evident conflicting nature of the process in our case. We did not specify an a priori perspective but 
induced it during data analysis (Robey, Ross and Boudreau, 2002). In a dialectical process model (Van 
de Ven and Poole, 1995) the process can result in four different outcomes: synthesis, pluralism, thesis 
or antithesis. An outcome may lead to another contradicting antithesis that sets off another dialectical 
process. 
Dialectical process theory is one of four types of “motors of change” in organizations proposed by Van 
de Ven and Poole (1995). Life cycle, teleological, and evolutionary mechanisms may serve as alternative 
theories in explaining change in organizations. At a meta level, process theorizing is concerned with 
how something happens and these four types of theories prescribe the rules and processes of how entities 
interact ideally (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). Their motors of change also differ according to the se-
quence of change events. While a prescribed mode is about incremental and predictable change process 
(such as in evolution and life cycle models), constructive motor which includes dialectical and teleolog-
ical models, generates novel, unprecedented “departures from the past” (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995).  
We chose the dialectical model in our study, because, first, we examine the interaction between two 
distinct groups – public sector actors and banks – thesis and antithesis. Here, we refer to the public sector 
actors as a stakeholder group including various internal and external stakeholders and other related gov-
ernmental agencies involved in decision-making (Axelsson, Melin and Lindgren, 2013). Public-private 
collaboration in developing e-government services is known to be bound to the distribution of power 
dependence between the government and the private actors (Medaglia et al., 2017b). Thus, secondly, 
the entities in our case confront each other and engage in a dialogue. The sequence by which the thesis 
and antithesis confront each other is highly unpredictable and can result in different outcomes at differ-
ent points of time. Dialectical process research seeks to explain how the dialogue and confrontation 
emerges, develops, and diminishes over time. As suggested by Van de Ven (1992), “it is even better to 
undertake real-time study of strategic change processes as they unfold”. Our case of eID development 
in Finland exhibits a high degree of uncertainty on the ground that it is a contemporary phenomenon. 
Lastly, the outcome of confrontation could consist of either a new entity (synthesis); the defeat of one 
entity (either thesis or antithesis) or a conflict (pluralism). The outcome may lead to another cycle of a 
dialectical process representing a second-order change (Van de Ven and Poole, 1995). 
3 Research approach 
This section describes the processes of data collection and analysis. We chose a qualitative case study 
approach for this study (Yin, 2011). We use the abductive approach with the dialectics lens in mind and 
the data analysis as in Grounded Theory (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). 
3.1 Data collection 
This article reports findings that are part of a larger research project focusing on eID development since 
2016 (Bazarhanova, Yli-Huumo and Smolander, 2018; 2019). During this project, we have already col-
lected observations of eID in multiple data collection rounds. In this report, we analyse only the inter-
views that were conducted during the year 2018, in which the actors were asked about the framework 
implementation progress. 
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 Case organization, interviews Role in eID ecosystem Interview period, 2018 
1 The Finnish Financial Supervisory 
Authority (FSA) 
Financial regulatory authority  Winter  
2 Ministry of Finance, MoF (x2) Regulatory body Winter, spring 
3 Bank 1 BankID provider Winter 
4 Bank 2 BankID provider Summer 
5 Bank of Finland Central bank of Finland Spring 
6 Broker company (x2) Incumbent Service Broker (SB) Winter, spring 
7 API consultant Public sector consultant Spring 
8 Technology company  Technology provider, ambitious 
newcomer in eID 
Spring 
9 Finnish Federation of Financial ser-
vices – Finance Finland (FFI) 
Representative of the banks and 
the Finnish financial sector 
Summer 
10 Finnish Communications Regula-
tory Authority  (Ficora) 
Public authority and regulatory 
body 
Summer 
11 MyData expert Industry advisor Summer 
Table 1.  Case-organizations interviewed and their roles. Two banks cover around 73% of the 
population in Finland.  
Table 1 provides a summary of all interviews. The interviewed experts come from the following organ-
izations in Finnish eID ecosystem: identity providers, service brokers, industry advisors and various 
governmental organizations that supervise and orchestrate the eID market in Finland. The interviews 
were semi-structured (Yin, 2011) and lasted on average 45 minutes. The total interview time was 9 hours 
45 minutes. We recorded, transcribed and analysed each interview with a qualitative data coding and 
analysis tool, Atlas.ti. Each interview began by asking the interviewee’s position, background, experi-
ence and role in the organization. The interviews covered the following topics: the role of the organiza-
tion in the eID ecosystem; the challenges, issues, and experiences with FTN framework; opinions on 
implementation strategies and justifications.  
In addition to collecting different views from banks, government, and independent organizations, we 
collected secondary data from government reports, press releases, reports and news found online. The 
secondary data is described in Table 2. 
 
Date published Type of data Reference 
31.10.2014 Official document, FFI’s (Finance Finland) response on FTN 
and the changes to strong electronic identification 
https://bit.ly/2pZ7EhK 
12.11.2014 Official document, A new law may endanger e-commerce, FFI https://bit.ly/2P8ZPUC 
31.5.2016 Official document, Request for opinion from the Ficora on FTN, 
FFI 
https://bit.ly/2AhlH8i 
06.06.2016 Official document, The statement of FFI on unrealistic transition 
times to FTN 
https://bit.ly/2CPFmyx 
07.12.2016 Explanatory notes to Regulation 72: Electronic identification 
and trust services 
https://bit.ly/2DCMgqp 
04.10.2017 FICORA’s explanatory memorandum on the provision of 
weak and strong identification services 
https://bit.ly/2DDyqE7 
04.10.2017 Memorandum on questions relating to interpretation 
raised in negotiations between trust network members 
https://bit.ly/2R7lwCu 
15.09.2017 Opinion statement, FiCom’s statement on the need for price reg-
ulation and supporting the FTN 
https://bit.ly/2AfJYLV 
Bazarhanova et al. /Explaining an eID framework implementation 
Twenty-Seventh European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS2019), Stockholm-Uppsala, Sweden. 6 
 
Accessed 
18.10.2018 
News, Is BankID positioned for the future?, CEO of the Norwe-
gian identity scheme BankID 
https://bit.ly/2P97m5K 
28.08.2018 Press release, The state is exploring alternatives for citizens’ 
electronic identification, Ministry of Finance 
https://bit.ly/2LzSKGK 
28.08.2018 News, Governmental opinion that BankID usage is too expen-
sive for the state 
https://bit.ly/2NP9f30 
30.08.2018 News, FiCom about the increase in the use of MobileIDs  https://bit.ly/2yJ0emB 
30.08.2018 News, In addition to the obsolescence, the BankID will cost 
more to the government in the future 
https://bit.ly/2CS34dz 
24.08.2018 New step taken towards a common KYC infrastructure https://bit.ly/2P7sfhT 
Table 2.  Secondary data. 
3.2 Data analysis 
In the data analysis, we used the techniques of the Grounded Theory method. This systematic approach 
to qualitative inquiry helped us to deal with the rich data we collected that is full of diverging perspec-
tives, opinions and insights (Strauss and Corbin, 1990). We analysed the data in three phases: open, 
axial and selective coding. The data analysis started after all interviews had been conducted. We looked 
for the events related to the implementation of the Finnish eID framework, including key actors’ in-
volvement, important decisions and events, challenges and limitations that are related to the governance, 
as well as development and future use of eIDs.  
It became quickly obvious that the contradictions could be broadly categorized in two opposing views: 
views of the banks providing the BankID and the rest of Finland led by regulators. By highlighting the 
most apparent contradictions, we coded them in relation to the subjects of disagreement: pricing, archi-
tectural settings of the new framework, strategies employed by parties as well as planned objectives and 
actual outcomes. The result of the open coding phase was an unstructured list of characterizing codes 
attached to the text and notes to explaining the content of codes, see Table 3. 
 
Extracts from the data Codes used 
Thesis: Banks’ perspective as providers of BankID  
“Tupas [Finnish BankID protocol] is definitely a legacy and it will 
be replaced with new protocols during the next year. It is an old 
technology and description, has drawbacks and so on”, Bank 1. 
Problem definition: technology ob-
solescence; 
“The lawmakers have their own goals. That was, I guess, the ex-
plicit goal of the government to break the monopoly. But it does not 
solve the problem, it just subsidizes the new players”, Bank 2. 
“It was some kind politician game play”, Bank 2. 
Goals and interests: break the mo-
nopoly and open the market; 
Antithesis: governmental and regulatory perspective  
“There is always resistance, independent in which industry it hap-
pens. When somebody forces you to grant access to your infrastruc-
ture. That was also in energy and telecom industries before”, FSA. 
“And in the end one reason is of course the old market players the 
banks, especially the big ones, want to like to keep the market posi-
tions”, Ficora. 
FTN approach is similar to access 
regulation in telecom; 
Resistance has been expected; Re-
sistance cause is granting access to 
your infrastructure; 
“One bank for example left an offer which was at least two times 
more expensive than the current contract. And we don’t know how 
they figured out the price, they doubled”, MoF. [This happened be-
cause the offered price structure was the regulated 10 cents + the 
brokers margin]. 
Conflict: pricing, cost compensa-
tion; 
Conflict: unsuccessful procurement 
rounds; 
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“But during the [first procurement] it was very obvious that some 
key players they did not realize they could sell their own device and 
do their own broker, some eID providers were expecting that there 
needs to be always an external service brokers”, MoF. 
Communication problems; 
Process: regulation interpretations 
difficulties, implicit messages; 
“TUPAS [the cost of implementing it] is way too expensive and it 
is a bank monopoly, it is difficult to scale it for all sort of services 
because it is too expensive. Why is it so expensive? I don’t know – 
it is like a money-making machine for banks. It definitely did bring 
many benefits in Finland and it has been working nicely in Finland, 
but it is kind of reaching its limits”, MyData expert. 
Problems definition: market leader-
ship, scalability issues, expensive, 
local protocol; 
Table 3.  Open coding examples 
In the phase of axial coding, we identified the relationships among the codes from the open coding 
phase. By categorizing the open codes into groups and merging similar ones and disintegrating different 
concepts, we derived the elements contributing to the dialectical process. The subjects of conflict ele-
ments along with the definitions of the matter and representative quotes are presented in the Findings 
section, see Table 4. As the views of interviewees were not always diverging, in the same table we also 
outline the points of agreements among stakeholders. The objective of selective coding involved the 
harmonization of the axial codes from the previous phase, see Table 5. We tried to develop and refine 
further the discrete concepts of conflicts described above. The objective of this phase of coding was to 
identify the abstracted, yet empirically grounded, core concepts of the dialectical rationale, which are 
discussed in detail in the next section. 
4 Findings 
In this section, we explain all of the conflict items or dialectics and illustrate how they influenced each 
other as the process unfolded. The sequences of change events in dialectical process theory are (1) thesis, 
antithesis  (2) confrontation  (3) synthesis or thesis/antithesis or pluralism. At the moment of writing 
(October 2018) the ecosystem is in the stage (3) of pluralism, see Figure 1, and we believe that our 
analysis will help in understanding the progress of the dialectical process and in finding ways that con-
sensus can be achieved.  
 
Figure 1.  Main dialectical process model. Thesis and antithesis consist of two contradictory as-
sumptions and goals. The government employs the regulatory mechanism to achieve 
their goals and encounter resistance from the banks. Two sides engage in dialogue on 
budget, business and technology aspects. Three procurement rounds lead to a synthe-
sis, which appears to be temporary, while the pluralism of opposing views dominates.  
The first conflict concerns a contradiction in goals. The apparent interests of BankID providers in 
providing BankID services can be explained by sustaining revenue streams from selling the services, 
and by the strategic importance of having a leadership position in the market that provides an access to 
customers. The Finnish government’s attitude towards the banks’ dominance in eID provision is more 
Thesis: Banks
 Maintain status quo
 BankID as a proprietary 
platform
Confrontation
 Pricing models
 Architectures
Pluralism
 The government seeks 
for new eID solutions
 Status quo maintained 
(temporarily)
Regulation:
 Infrastructuring attitude
 Hard enforcement
 Communication 
Resistance: 
 Defacto role
 
Antithesis: Government
 Change status quo
 BankID as a national 
eID infrastructure
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critical, yet opaque. On the one hand, the state has benefited considerably from the wide dissemination 
of BankID. On the other hand, one of the governmental functions is to regulate monopolistic behaviours 
in the market. Although BankID is not a natural monopoly, due to the existence of the alternative e-
identification methods (MobileID and FineID) the entry barriers in the market for new players are high. 
The objectives of FTN framework, according to the regulators, is (1) to expand the adoption of eID 
among service providers, (2) to comply with the most recent budget coming from FTN, and (3) to create 
more market competition by (4) breaking the banks’ ‘monopolistic’ position. The objectives of the state 
exhibit not only an apparent antithesis towards the banks but also an acute analytical asymmetry, i.e. 
creating more competition in the market by restraining the market leaders in order to increase cost sav-
ings and enable more widespread adoption of eID. One of the banks commented:  
“It [the framework] is pushing down the costs of new entrants so [new entrants] don’t have to 
ask the prices from the customers. That way the competition can grow. But the work is kind of 
subsidized by the banks, which is not fair at all”.  
The second conflict, termed the power to regulate concerns the different perspectives used in analysing 
BankID. BankID, first of all, is a proprietary platform developed and managed by banks; it is also a 
national e-identification infrastructure, which is important for the (digital) functioning of the country. 
The use of familiar bank identifiers for accessing digital e-governmental services helped in achieving 
high citizen use of e-government services. However, the primary use of BankID is in banking, as part 
of compliance with customer due diligence standards, and only secondarily as a service offered to vari-
ous relying parties from the public and private sector. Therefore, banks have a different understanding 
that the state regarding the involvement of regulators in business-model decision-making, and this as a 
result brought the two sides into a confrontation.   
The framework implementation practices have exacerbated the disagreements between two sides. Ac-
cording to Finnish banks we interviewed, the Finnish regulators should have re-evaluated their choice 
of whether to employ hard or soft power when managing the transformation, and this we regard as the 
third conflict.  
“[Making changes by means of law] is quite often considered a hostile way of doing it, and 
people are not voluntarily doing it. Definitely there could have been another soft way to build 
the FTN from a business perspective and [the method of doing it by law] is extremely slow”, 
commented Bank 2.  
This refers to the use of soft power in trying to achieve co-opetition, rather than unilaterally forcing the 
changes. According to one of the experts, focusing on the decision-making group’s cohesion, building 
trust, and achieving mutual understanding between the stakeholders could significantly contribute to the 
openness for compromise and the willingness to find win-win solutions.   
The fourth conflict arose from the ‘infrastructuring’ attitude that is in the core of the FTN framework. 
By infrastructuring we imply the concept of making the platform more physical (Constantinides, Hen-
fridsson and Parker, 2018) and pushing it to act as the backbone and enabler in the ecosystem. The 
framework has been repeatedly referred to the kind of Access regulation used in communications net-
works (European Commission, 2002), which sets obligations on telecom network operators with signif-
icant market power for when they grant other companies in the telecommunications sector access to 
their networks in return for a fee. The infrastructuring issues were raised by banks, such as:  
“How can the state come in and just take something the banks have done and created and say 
that you will have to give this value to other players” have been responded to by regulators in 
the form, “I know that the banks are giving that message, but in the end it is quite a minor 
issue”.  
Such an attitude points to the path dependency of the approaches employed by regulators to supervising 
the market. The digital identification infrastructure has been treated similarly to physical telecommuni-
cation infrastructures. The following comment is in line with this view:  
Bazarhanova et al. /Explaining an eID framework implementation 
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“… banks have to think about big questions. Do they still want to provide the UX [user experi-
ence] themselves or just become an infrastructure company that maintains the infrastructure 
and let someone else do the UX things”?  
The fifth conflict over framework implementation practice refers to communication problems. The two 
contrasting views point to the opposing experiences of the two sides. Whereas the banks describe the 
process as “lacking discussion and a shared understanding among the stakeholders”, the regulators refer 
to full transparency and openness in communication that “they worked closely with industry in making 
this framework, so all the market players had the ability to participate”. In the words of one of our 
interviewees from the banks side:  
“After these two [procurement] rounds they finally realized that it is an impossible scenario, 
and they started to actually rethink the whole setup based on all the comments that we have 
built up during the year. We can’t see how this [the framework] will ever work, we are stating 
so everywhere”.  
The pricing model and new ecosystem architecture, which we regard as sixth and seventh elements, led 
to further disputes between the banks and government. The initial identification and its price compen-
sation was one the main source of disagreement between the two sides. Banks describe the initial iden-
tification as an expensive process, which is part of their Know Your Customer (KYC) requirements 
checks, where the customer must physically visit the bank office.  
“The cheapest pricing that we know for doing the KYC on internet is around 5 euros. That is 
the digital onboarding. nothing physical. And the government say they will pay only half of it”, 
FFI.  
Another stakeholder group (FiCom, alliance telecom operators) supports the price cap introduction (“the 
costs of non-identification regulation should be taken into account when determining the maximum price 
for initial identification”) by referring to the requirement for banks to perform KYC checks as part of 
banking-specific regulations. The new architectural setup in the framework brought regulators into an 
increasing conflict with incumbent banks. Chaining of the initial identification, that is, where new strong 
e-identifiers (e.g., MobileID) could be created based on existing credentials (e.g., BankID), was not 
received positively by the banks. MobileID method providers have promptly supported the chaining 
concept stating:  
“The development of the market without the legislator's involvement would have been slow”.  
The eID chaining concept resembles the number portability regulation, where consumers can change 
their mobile operator while keeping their old phone number. 
Because of the confrontation, service broker companies have experienced difficulties in negotiating with 
some banks. The banks were described as reacting with a “slowdown” tactic, also known as an “Italian 
strike”, where workers perform their tasks exactly as they are required, but no better (or no faster in this 
case). The semi-successful procurement rounds with the public sector have led to a pluralism phase. 
Although the agreements with all banks were, in fact, reached after the third bidding round, the synthesis 
accomplishment is a temporary arrangement. The intention of the state to investigate new methods for 
national eIDs manifests the persistence of opposing views and shows a distrust to the success of the 
planned FTN approach. Table 4 offers a more detailed description of each dialectic element and Table 
5 offers the categorization of the element type.  
 
Dialectic name Explanations for the elements in the di-
alectical process, code examples 
Example quotes 
Dialectic of 
goals 
Conflicting goals to maintain status quo 
and to change it. Moreover, the asym-
metry of objectives and political interests 
in the objectives to “increase the market 
competition” and “break the banks’ mo-
nopoly”. 
“The main purpose is that there can be the real 
competition”, Ficora. 
“I don’t see it anymore as the effort to increase 
the competition I see it as the effort to keep the 
budget”, FFI. 
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Goal: open the market; Objective: cost 
savings; Political interest: cut costs and 
to weaken the role of banks in eID; 
Goal: sustain status quo; 
 
“Banks are not supposed to dictate how and when 
people authenticate”. 
“We don’t understand the logic behind this. As 
far as I know, there are not too many people in 
this country understand the logic”. 
“The walls are coming down, banks cannot live in 
an ivory tower anymore”. 
Dialectic of 
power to regu-
late 
The degree of involvement of the regula-
tors in decisions about the technical, busi-
ness changes in the infrastructure led to 
the conflict. The governments’ perspec-
tive to regulate the national infrastructure 
and banks’ perspective to control their 
proprietary platform. 
“First of all, technical things should be never 
governed by law at all. FTN of course [has] some 
of the concepts can be there somehow, but there 
has been way too much regulation touching the 
business models”, Bank 2. 
“The world is moving faster than the lawmakers” 
(banks) vs “The development of the market with-
out the legislators will be too slow”, (Ficom, tele-
com alliance). 
Dialectic of in-
frastructuring 
Some core ideas in the framework resem-
ble the Access regulation (European 
Commission, 2002) in telecom industry. 
Banks’ resistance to a forced opening of 
their e-identification infrastructure. 
FTN as the access regulation in telecom, 
employing familiar strategies; Approach: 
banking resembles telecom; 
“There is always resistance, independent in 
which industry it happens. When somebody forces 
you to grant access to your infrastructure. That 
was also that has been in energy and telecom”. 
Dialectic of 
hard vs. soft 
power 
Implementation style described as hard 
enforcement and the lack of motivation to 
search for win-win solutions provoked 
the conflict further. 
FTN as the hostile way of governing the 
market; 
“Because the technology is just a technology and 
the government makes the legislation which 
makes us invest in something and there is no pay-
back”, Broker company. 
“I would say the way FTN was built, kind of forc-
ing it to the model they like. That does not im-
prove innovation at all but makes companies pro-
tective almost hostile to each other”, Bank 2. 
“Yes, the broker role and lower prices are a good 
idea. But the approach was very hostile, Bank 2”, 
“[Could have been] some soft ways to boost kind 
of cooperation between companies”, FFI. 
Dialectic of 
communication 
The problems related to the lack of dis-
cussion and common understanding be-
tween sides contributed to a confronta-
tion. 
Contradiction: made closely with the in-
dustry (regulators view); Resistance was 
expected, unsuccessful procurement of 
eIDs was not (regulators view); 
Dialogue: misunderstanding why negoti-
ations are taking long; 
Dialogue: the regulation interpretations 
difficulties; 
“But we made this closely with industry, so all the 
market players had ability to participate”, Fi-
cora. 
“I don’t know – there was some kind of lacking 
the discussion and understanding”, FFI. 
“They let us know in a politician way – you have 
to read between the lines what they expect”, Bank 
2. 
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Dialectic of 
changes to the 
architecture 
Disagreements on the new ecosystem de-
sign by (1) putting service brokers be-
tween the e-government platform (Su-
omi.fi) and IdPs and (2) eIDs chaining, 
i.e., creation of new eIDs based on exist-
ing; 
New architecture by not treating Suomi.fi 
as a full broker as “the biggest design er-
ror”;  
FTN’s strategy to attract new IdPs by al-
lowing them not to charge the end users, 
i.e., subsidizing newcomers, (“exploit-
ing” the incumbents); 
 “Actually suomi.fi should be the broker. And that 
is the problem”, FFI. 
“Inserting the brokers into the value chain, how 
could it in theory work if you have got a service 
that has a price cap, and then you insert a player 
in between, how could that cut the cost? That kind 
of controversies”, FFI. 
“Well I think it is mainly legal issue, it is kind of 
there is no governmental service provider mess 
with the market”, Ficora. 
Dialectic of 
changes to the 
pricing model 
Disagreements on cost compensations for 
first-time identification (2.5 EUR) and 
that the regulation allows the digital iden-
tities chaining, and creating a potential 
“free riders” problem; 
“Well in the end the old players get the fee from 
using it. … What banks have said that it costs a 
lot … the actual cost might be quite a little bit … 
it is quite minor part. I think it is not so big is-
sue”, Ficora. 
“Unexpectedly it looks like that state said that 
they will get this price or little less. And it will 
never work”, Bank 2. 
Agreement 
points 
Apart from conflicting views there were 
common understanding and agreements 
on the following issues: 
1. TUPAS is a legacy protocol and the 
need for legacy software protocol replac-
ing; 
2. Service broker role is the advantage for 
relying parties; 
3. Lower prices for eID transactions; 
“Tupas is definitely a legacy and it will be re-
placed with new protocols during the next year. It 
is an old technology and description, has draw-
backs and so on”, Bank 2. 
“Definitely the trust network that you can buy it 
from one broker is a brilliant thing”, Bank 1. 
“We would have done it anyways, voluntarily 
without the FTN one day. But this has just 
speeded up the change a bit”, Bank 2. 
Table 4.  Elements contributing to the dialectical process. First two elements are inherent to the 
nature of two opposing forces. Next three elements refer to the implementation prac-
tices, which are subject to accommodation and fine-tuning. Last two conflict elements 
are the consequences of the dialectical situation.    
Summary. The root cause of the problems with the FTN include the conflicting goals of the government 
and banks; that is, the regulators’ interests to create more competition in the market, cost savings, de-
crease the dependence on banks vs. the objectives of the banks to maintain the status quo. The dual role 
of the BankID as a proprietary platform and a national eID infrastructure also contributes to the conflict. 
The framework implementation practices, such as the hard enforcement strategy, inherent infrastructur-
ing mindset and communication problems, have considerably contributed to further conflict develop-
ment. Divergent views on the framework architecture and the pricing models are the outcomes of the 
confrontation. 
 
Legitimacy  Implementation practice Solution features 
Goals (political interests, objectives) 
Power to regulate 
Communication 
Hard vs. soft power 
Infrastructuring attitude 
Architecture 
Pricing model 
 
Table 5.  Dialectical process elements organized by their types. 
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5 Discussion 
In this study, we identify the challenges faced by regulatory bodies in attempts of getting the changes 
that meet private providers’ needs while simultaneously following national and EU regulations. Moe et 
al. (2017) also studied the public procurement of information systems and showed that on one hand, the 
goal of regulators is to acquire a system that best suits the requirements; on the other hand, the regulators 
can be restricted by the limited dialogue with participants in the interests of equal opportunities and 
transparency. Banks on the other hand, as main players in financial markets, are facing new challenges 
(and opportunities) stemming from digitalization or processes and new technologies (e.g., decentraliza-
tion brought by blockchain), new regulations (e.g., PSD2) and rapidly changing global landscape 
(fintech start-ups and global platforms). While a multitude of overlapping regulations and budget con-
trols restrain the regulators side, the banks’ resistance in implementing the changes are because they are 
for-profit organizations. 
Our theoretical contribution is a nuanced understanding of how the dialectics play out in the transfor-
mation process of a nation-wide e-identification infrastructure. Unlike previous research on e-identifi-
cation schemes, we explicitly focus on stakeholders’ involvement in the process of resistance and ac-
quiescence and the role of their inherent contrasting viewpoints in the development of a dialectical sit-
uation. While the dialectical situation in Finland will change over time, the thesis and antithesis whether 
the government or private sector should fully control the eID infrastructure will remain. This is in line 
with the discussions in Moe et al. (2017) and Nordheim & Päivärinta (2006) who raised the question on 
the importance of a conscious search for contradictions, acknowledgment of which should lead to a 
suitable strategy of reaching the synthesis. In other words, by considering the dialectical elements on 
legitimacy (goals and power to regulate) as constant, changing variables on the implementation practice 
(communication, power and an infrastructuring attitude) and solution features (architecture and pricing 
model) could result in different outcomes. This study forms a relevant case for future research on digital 
infrastructure evolution as a result of dialectical dynamics in public-private sector relationship.  
Finland is not the only country where BankID is the dominant e-identification method; Sweden, Norway 
and Denmark also rely on market-procured eID infrastructures. Söderström (2016) studied the introduc-
tion of a similar public sector eID framework in Sweden and found the negative consequences in the 
processes of framework introduction due to ignored or unresolved resistance from affected actors. Un-
like the Finnish FTN, Swedish eID framework’s approach was to stimulate the market without suppress-
ing the incumbents (i.e., no price regulations or eIDs chaining). It is important to know that Sweden’s 
BankID follows a four-corner business model, i.e., there is a trust agreement that allows for the roaming 
of BankID requests between participating banks. Governments seem to react differently to an increased 
dependency on the private sector: some regulative efforts, as in Finland, seek to eliminate the legacy 
ties to banks, while others, e.g., in Sweden, create regulations with these public-private inter-dependen-
cies in mind. This poses an interesting research question whether the different cooperative or antagonis-
tic modes coming from the government are reciprocally dependent on the level of cooperation among 
banks themselves.  
There are at least two implications for practice from our study. First is about governance of public and 
private relationships. The use of dialectical process model has enabled our understanding of the conflict 
roots, mechanisms that created greater conflict, and the consequences. The governance aspect of the 
transformation seems to be one of the main problems contributing to the pluralism phase in the Finnish 
case. Clearly, the ecosystem needs a strong leader organization to coordinate the actors within the groups 
and across the ecosystem. As a practical advice, the literature suggests the benefits of creating a neutral 
body when managing such public-private ventures (Eaton et al., 2014). As the government’s view on 
the case is not necessarily stable over time, there is a need for a strong orchestrator that is capable of 
regulating the big players, defining clear rules and aligning the interests. In a similar study of public-
private partnerships in Denmark (Medaglia et al., 2017b), the authors emphasize that for the successful 
establishment of common e-government infrastructures the parties need to aim for achieving mutual 
benefits that require overcoming any legacy thinking. This entails, unsurprisingly, collaboration and 
openness of the involved parties to envision how they can reach common goals.  
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Second, our findings raise important questions related to the long-term sustainability of public-private 
infrastructures. In the early years of digitalisation of the e-government services, also when the national 
FineID card proved to be unsuccessful, the solution provided by the banks was a ‘lifesaver’. With the 
transaction volumes growing exponentially, and the price per transaction not decreasing fast enough, 
the mood changes more towards changing the status quo. We observe that the need and importance of 
full control over the infrastructure changes relative to the economic dependence. The tensions we found 
indicate that the problems of lack of resilient business models in public-private partnerships have not 
been solved (Teece, 2018). This indicates a strong need for future research on policy developments as 
well as empirical studies investigating the success factors and evolution of similar market-procured in-
frastructures. 
Although this is not the first study of an IT procurement process in the governance of public-private 
infrastructures using dialectical process lens, our findings are original and provide implications to pol-
icy-makers and practitioners. In this article, we report the conflict items that were identifiable from the 
Finnish eID case. In our analysis, we focused on the explicit search for contradictions and pluralism of 
a short period. In future research, our plan is to observe how these dialectics play out over time. 
6 Conclusion 
Market-procured e-identification mechanisms raise significant policy, technological, managerial and 
societal questions. Different governance solutions can emerge as the result of converging or diverging 
interests and interdependency of resources between the private and the public sector over time. We 
observed the conflicts in the Finnish implementation of the changes to the market-procured eID infra-
structure. The conflict roots come from opposing goals of the government and the banks; as well as the 
dual role of the BankID as the proprietary platform and the national eID infrastructure. However, the 
conflict has been amplified by the framework implementation practices that include hard enforcement 
strategy, inherent infrastructuring mindset of regulators and the lack of communication. As a result, 
confrontation on the framework architecture and the pricing models led to the pluralism phase, i.e., lack 
of consensus. Our analysis shows how the explicit goal of eliminating the dominant role of a market-
procured solution manifests a larger concept of lack of integrity in public-private collaboration. Future 
development would require new models of collaboration with clear mutual incentives and benefits for 
both public and private sectors. 
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